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ABOLITIONIST POLITICAL AND




It is by now a familiar and well-evidenced historical claim that the
Reconstruction Amendments were an outgrowth of the abolitionist polit-
ical and constitutional theory of the antebellum period;' but such reason-
able historical consensus on this matter does not, paripassu, tell us how
this historical claim should guide our interpretation of the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments. Three main problems arise with such a simplistic in-
terpretation. First, abolitionist political and constitutional theory was
internally complex. It can be divided into at least three antagonistic
schools of thought-radical disunionism, moderate antislavery and radi-
cal antislavery.2 Presumably, however, good historical argument could
discriminate among the various strands of abolitionist thought, and iden-
tify the one among them that crucially shaped the terms of the Recon-
struction Amendments.
But second, even if we had such good historical analysis, the terms
of such an abolitionist theory could be understood at various levels, some
quite abstract and others quite concrete; complex internal disagreements
* Professor of Law, New York University Law School; A.B., 1966, Harvard College; D.
Phil., 1970, Oxford University; J.D., 1971, Harvard Law School.
1. See generally MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CON-
STITUTION (1968); HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1973); HAROLD M. HYMAN &
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1835-1875 (1982); ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS:
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE IN A RACIST SOCIETY 1866-1883 (1987); ROBERT
J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988);
JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (2d ed. 1969) (originally published as THE ANTI-
SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (Univ. of Cal. Press 1951)); Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REv. 368 (1972-73).
2. For a good historical study of these various movements, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK,
THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977).
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will appear at all these levels, and it is not obvious what weight, if any,
we should accord any one of them in the interpretation of the Recon-
struction Amendments today. For example, some abolitionists were re-
markably critical of American racism; others were less critical, and
members of the Reconstruction Congress thus held diverse views about
the degree to which the substantive terms of the amendments (like equal
protection) should be understood to condemn concrete practices like
state-sponsored segregation.' Senator Charles Sumner and some others
regarded such segregation as inconsistent with equal protection;4 most
others arguably did not.' Whose concrete convictions should prevail in
shaping constitutional interpretation today?
Finally, the interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments must
make sense of their interpretation over time, including our contemporary
sense of grave interpretive mistakes like Plessy v. Ferguson 6 and correc-
tions thereof like Brown v. Board of Education.' The best interpretation
of such evolving interpretive practice cannot reasonably be understood as
some simplistic tracking of a prior concrete historical understanding-
indeed, on such a view Plessy would be right and Brown wrong.' Rather,
our evolving and self-correcting interpretive experience must be under-
stood in some other way in which various factors, including history,
must be given appropriate weight in the larger interpretive project of
American constitutionalism.
To address these questions reasonably, we need to ask meta-inter-
pretive questions about constitutional interpretation as a complex, histor-
ically self-conscious practice of understanding the supreme law of the
Constitution in the United States and the role the Reconstruction
Amendments play or should be understood to play in that project.
American constitutionalism is a complex genre of historically evolving
interpretive practices aspiring to narrative integrity centering on the text
and institutions that express a people's self-conscious historical struggle
to achieve a politically legitimate government which would guarantee all
persons equal human rights.9 The Reconstruction Amendments express
3. See NELSON, supra note 1, at 133-34.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 134-36.
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. For a notable example of an approach under which Brown is wrongly decided, see
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 230-45 (1977).
9. On the role of integrity in legal interpretation in general, and constitutional interpreta-
tion in particular, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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the greatest struggle of the American people since the founding to re-
member and recover the narrative thread of that story. I shall argue that
the study of abolitionist political and constitutional theory enables us to
clarify the place of these amendments in our constitutionalism because it
offers an enriched understanding of both that struggle and its resolution
in a permanent constitutional legacy to posterity. The Reconstruction
Amendments address central defects in the legitimacy of the Constitu-
tion as supreme law as it had been interpreted in the antebellum period-
a period very similar in methodological spirit to the revolutionary consti-
tutionalism that the Founders of 1787 had brought to bear on the British
Constitution. Abolitionist political and constitutional theory was the ve-
hicle of this critical reflection on our constitutionalism. Therefore, study
of these theories advances understanding of what our traditions are and
how we should think about the proper interpretive attitude to be taken as
to the role of these amendments in the preservation and legitimacy of the
Constitution as supreme law.
II. ANTEBELLUM CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
The appropriate framework for an analysis of these matters must be
the growing sense of crisis in constitutional legitimacy during the ante-
bellum period. This was initially marked by the claims of the success of
Calhoun's proslavery constitutionalism I° and then by its cumulative
political successes. The success of Calhoun's constitutionalism is seen
first in Congress's repeal of the Missouri Compromise in the Kansas-
Nebraska Act of 1854 sponsored by Stephen Douglas's theory of popular
sovereignty,"1 and then in the Supreme Court's adoption of the central
claims of Calhoun's constitutionalism in Dred Scott v. Sandford."2 The
narrow issue of constitutional interpretation common to both these mat-
ters was the power or lack of power of Congress to forbid slavery in the
territories. But the deeper question of constitutional legitimacy, posed by
Lincoln among others,13 was the interpretive attitude taken by Douglas
and Taney to the text of the Constitution of the United States. This atti-
10. See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT: AND SELECTIONS
FROM THE DiscouRsE 44-45 (G. Gordon Post ed., 1943) (1853). For useful commentary, see
AUGUST 0. SPAIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN (1951).
11. See DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 145-76 (1976).
12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). For commentary, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE
DRED ScoTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 46-47, 126, 140-41
(1978); POTTER, supra note 11, at 267-96.
13. See, eg., Abraham Lincoln, Fifth Joint Debate at Galesburg (October 7, 1858), in THE
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 206, 219-20 (Robert W. Johannsen ed., 1965) (arguing blacks
were included in Declaration of Independence).
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tude disengaged its interpretation from the Lockean political theory of
the Declaration of Independence, namely, that all persons subject to
political power have inalienable human rights. Calhoun, in contrast to
other Southern constitutionalists like John Taylor of Caroline,'4 had rad-
ically defended his positivistic reading of the Constitution on grounds of
a self-conscious repudiation of the very idea of inalienable human rights,
and thus consistently argued that the Constitution should not be inter-
preted, either at the state or federal level, as a document with a vision of
equal human rights.15 Lincoln and others granted that the best interpre-
tation of the history and text of the Constitution protected slavery in the
states that had it. They distinguished, however, this short-term political
compromise from the more long-term ambition of the Constitution to
protect human rights-requiring federal power to protect human rights
by forbidding slavery in the federal territories and thus over time encour-
aging slavery's gradual abolition by the states that retained it.16 Such an
interpretation would put slavery, as Lincoln argued that the Founders
intended, "in the course of ultimate extinction."' 7 By contrast, Cal-
houn's radical rights skepticism disallowed an interpretive attitude which
was sensitive to the ultimate long-term obligation of a constitutional gov-
ernment to respect the equal human rights of all persons subject to its
political power.
Although the issue in dispute was ostensibly a matter of constitu-
tional interpretation, in substance, the issue was the very legitimacy of
the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. The Constitution, as
supreme law, must have a basis that renders a respect for its terms more
legitimate than the laws over which it reigns supreme. Rights-based
political theory gave a natural and plausible substantive basis for such
legitimacy. The Constitution, when properly interpreted, was consistent
with this political theory, which secured conditions of respect for human
14. Taylor had offered a Jeffersonian rights-based theory of the Constitution that gave a
central role to the states in the protection of human rights and a correspondingly narrow role
to the federal government. See JOHN TAYLOR, NEW VIEWS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1971) (1823); JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CON-
STRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1970) (1820).
15. For Calhoun's most explicit attack on the Declaration of Independence as embodying
"the most dangerous of all political errors," and Jefferson's "utterly false view," see John C.
Calhoun, Speech on the Oregon Bill, before the Senate (June 27, 1848) reprinted in IV THE
WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 511, 512 (Richard K. Cralle ed., New York, D. Appleton &
Co. 1861).
16. See Abraham Lincoln, Address at Jonesboro (September 15, 1858), in THE LINCOLN-
DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 13, at 132.
17. See Abraham Lincoln, First Joint Debate, Ottawa (August 21, 1858), in THE LIN-
COLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note 13, at 55.
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rights. This alone rendered any exercise of political power legitimate,
and thus the claim of constitutional supremacy rested on the background
political theory which defined when an exercise of coercive power was
legitimate. The Constitution was supreme law because it enforced polit-
ical power that de-legitimated exercises of a restrictive political theory
which were inconsistent with its demands.
But how could one interpret the text and history of the Constitution
of the United States as consistent with this political theory in light of its
putative toleration of slavery, an institution resting on the abridgement of
basic human rights? One response to this question was common to a
proslavery radical like Calhoun and abolitionist radical disunionists like
William Lloyd Garrison 8 and Wendell Phillips: 9 namely, abandon any
attempt to interpret the Constitution in terms of rights-based political
theory. Calhoun, who was skeptical of rights as defensible political val-
ues, did not conclude that the Constitution was illegitimate; rather he
rested its legitimacy on other grounds, namely, a Hobbesian theory of
state sovereignty.20 Garrison and Phillips, however, believed in respect
for human rights as ultimate political values and concluded that the Con-
stitution, if not based on human rights, was illegitimate. The question
became, was there a way that the Constitution could be regarded as legit-
imate on the basis of rights-based political theory?
The goal of giving an affirmative answer to this question motivated
complex forms of internal and external criticism of the Constitution by
various forms of abolitionist political and constitutional theory. By in-
ternal criticism, I mean the criticism of mistaken interpretations of the
Constitution on the ground that the interpretations failed to elaborate
properly the principles of the Constitution itself. By external criticism, I
mean criticism of the Constitution, even properly interpreted, as incon-
sistent with enlightened critically defensible political values like respect
for human rights. Thus, both advocates of moderate and radical anti-
slavery internally criticized Dred Scott v. Sandford 21 as a mistaken inter-
pretation of relevant constitutional principles. Although many advocates
of moderate antislavery externally criticized slavery as a moral and polit-
18. See WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
OF WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON (photo. reprint 1968) (Boston, R.F. Wallcut 1852).
19. See Wendell Phillips, Introduction to THE CONSTrrUTION: A PRO-SLAVERY COM-
PACT 3-7 (photo. reprint 1969) (Wendell Phillips ed., New York American Anti-Slavery Soci-
ety 1844); WENDELL PHILLIPS, CAN ABOLITIONISTS VOTE OR TAKE OFFICE UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTruTION? (New York, American Anti-Slavery Society 1845).
20. For a good account of Calhoun's theory of sovereignty, see SPAIN, supra note 10, at
164-83.
21. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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ical wrong, moderate-in contrast to radical-antislavery did not, how-
ever, take the same negative view of the interpretive claim that slavery
was constitutional in the states that had adopted it.22 Such forms of both
internal and external criticism of the Constitution were grounded in the
tension acutely experienced by all of these abolitionists between the Con-
stitution and what they took to be its governing rights-based political
theory. On the one hand, the text and history of the Constitution appar-
ently contemplated the legitimacy of slavery at least at the state level;
23
on the other hand, the rights-based theory of the Constitution con-
demned slavery as a violation of inalienable human rights.24 Various
forms of abolitionist constitutional and political theory relieved this ten-
sion in different ways.
Perhaps the most plausible interpretive position was that of the
moderate antislavery movement .2  Fair interpretive weight was ac-
corded the text and history legitimizing slavery in the states as a reason-
able short-term compromise with an already entrenched institution that
the states could fairly be expected to abolish in due course. On the other
hand, fair interpretive weight was accorded the background political the-
ory of human rights by forbidding any legitimization of slavery by the
federal government in service of the long-term goal of respect for human
rights everywhere in the United States-including eventual abolition of
slavery by the states. The moderate antislavery theme-liberty national,
slavery local or sectional-thus gave full interpretive scope to the polit-
ical theory of human rights only at the national level; at the state level,
the political theory afforded a ground for external criticism and set a
long-term national goal of encouraging abolition.26
22. For a good general study on the diverse forms of political abolitionism, see RICHARD
H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES
1837-1860 (1976).
23. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States... according to their respective Numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons... and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.").
24. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 162-63 (William
Pedea ed., 1982) (1781).
25. For a seminal statement of the view, see Salmon P. Chase, The Address of the South-
era and Western Liberty Convention (June 11 & 12, 1845), in SALMON P. CHASE & CHARLES
D. CLEVELAND, ANTI-SLAVERY ADDRESSES OF 1844 AND 1845, at 1 (photo. reprint 1969)
(n.p., Sampson Low, Son, and Marston 1867).
26. For a statement of this moderate antislavery theme, see CHASE & CLEVELAND, supra
note 25, at 84-85.
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In contrast, advocates of radical antislavery, for example William
Goodell,27 Lysander Spooner2" and Joel Tiffany,29 accorded the political
theory of human rights decisive interpretive weight at both the national
and state levels. The interpretive implausibility of this approach was the
Constitution it claimed to be interpreting, in particular, the text and his-
tory of the Constitution bearing on the legitimacy of slavery at the state
level. The interpretive primacy of political theory was sustained and de-
fended by the most theoretically profound advocate of this position, Ly-
sander Spooner, by denying any weight to the constitutional text or
history in conflict with the claims of rights-based political theory. The
clauses of the Constitution apparently recognizing state-endorsed slavery
were to be interpreted not to recognize slavery on the theory that any
interpretation should be accorded the words, no matter how textually
strained, that did not recognize slavery.30 Furthermore, history was to
be disowned altogether, as a valid ground for interpretation, in favor of
focusing exclusively on the text itself-a text to be interpreted anti-posi-
tivistically in whatever way gave best effect to rights-based political the-
ory.31 The Constitution was to be interpreted in this way because,
otherwise, the Constitution could not be regarded as the supremely legiti-
mate law of the land. If slavery in the states which condoned it was
constitutional, such a constitutional claim would be a politically illegiti-
mate abridgement of human rights, indeed a just ground for the right to
revolution. As Joel Tiffany starkly put the radical antislavery point,
"give us change or revolution."32 To avoid such a crisis in constitutional
legitimacy, the Constitution was to be interpreted in the mode called for
by radical antislavery.
Both advocates of moderate and radical antislavery shared a com-
mon interest in analyzing how the interpretation of the Constitution
could have been so decadently unmoored from its basis in the political
theory of human rights-a national decadence reflected in the political
27. WILLIAM GOODELL, VIEWS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ITS BEARING
UPON AMERICAN SLAVERY (photo. reprint 1971) (Utica, Lawson & Chaplin, 2d ed. 1845).
28. LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (n.p. 1860).
29. JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAV-
ERY (photo. reprint 1969) (n.p. 1849).
30. Since the word "slave" was never expressly used, but rather "three fifths of all other
Persons," see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, or "Migration or Importation of Such Persons," see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, or "Person[s] held to Service or Labour," see U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 3, the radicals ascribed to these texts meanings that did not protect slavery. For
example, Spooner argued that the Three-fifths Clause applied not to Southern slaves, but
mainly to resident aliens. See 1 SPOONER, supra note 28, at 73-81.
31. See 2 SPOONER, supra note 28, at 146.
32. TIFFANY, supra note 29, at 99.
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successes of Calhoun's proslavery constitutionalism. The nerve of their
analysis-the "slave power conspiracy"33 -was an elaboration of the
Founders' theory of faction,34 only now applied to a form of faction that
had been fostered by the Constitution itself. The theory of faction had
identified pervasive tendencies of group psychology in politics to protect
the interests of some political group at the expense of denying fair respect
for the rights and interests of outsiders.3" Madison had argued in The
Federalist that the Constitution had structured the exercise of republican
political power in order to better ensure that such factions would not
achieve their mischievous ends at the expense of the governing political
theory of republican constitutionalism-respect for human rights and
pursuit of the public interest.3 6 The antislavery analysis of America's
constitutional decadence was that the Constitution, through augmenting
the political power of the slave states by the Three-Fifths Clause,37 had
so constitutionally entrenched the political power of slave-owning inter-
ests that their power as an effective political faction had flourished to the
degree that, inconsistent with the aims and theory of Madisonian consti-
tutionalism, these factions actually had subverted the Constitution.
Radical antislavery gave a distinctively deep moral and constitu-
tional analysis of the sources of the constitutional decadence in the Con-
stitution and what would be required to remedy the underlying
constitutional pathology. The premise of its distinctive approach was its
view of the proper understanding of the relationship of Lockean political
theory to constitutional interpretation. The foundation of this view had
been laid earlier by the abolitionist Theodore Weld in his analysis of the
wrongness of slavery; Weld's analysis invoked the Lockean political the-
ory that legitimate government must protect equal rights. He made a
similar appeal in explaining why Congress had the power to abolish slav-
ery in the District of Columbia:
It has been shown already that allegiance is exacted of the
slave. Is the government of the United States unable to grant
protection where it exacts allegiance? It is an axiom of the civi-
33. For a useful study of this idea, see DAVID B. DAVIS, THE SLAVE POWER CONSPIRACY
AND THE PARANOID STYLE (1969).
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (defining faction as some number of citi-
zens united by common interest adverse to rights of other citizens or community). For further
discussion of the Founders' theory of faction, see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 32-39 (1989).
35. See RICHARDS, supra note 34, at 32-39.
36. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). For further discussion, see RICH-
ARDS, supra note 34, at 105-30.
37. See U.S. CONT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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lized world, and a maxim even with savages, that allegiance
and protection are reciprocal and correlative. Are principles
powerless with us which exact homage of barbarians? Protec-
tion is the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT of every human being
under the exclusive legislation of Congress who has not forfeited
it by crime.38
This view assumed that black Americans, slave or free, were working
members of the American political community and, as such, subject to its
governing Lockean principles of a fair balance of rights and obligations
as a condition of allegiance. But many Americans, Lincoln being one of
them, wanted to distinguish the question of abolishing slavery in order to
recognize the natural rights of slaves from the question of further em-
powering the slaves with rights of membership in the American political
community.39 This explains the view of moderate antislavery that the
best theory of the Constitution would allow the national government to
achieve its goals of respect for human rights by the long-term abolition of
slavery and colonization of the freedmen abroad-thereby not including
them in the American political community. They were able to take this
view by ascribing decisional powers of the rights of American citizenship
to the states alone; thus, the national government might constitutionally
achieve the long-term abolition of slavery and colonize the freedmen
abroad without violating any nationally guaranteed constitutional rights
of the freedmen. But, if one believed, like Weld and many more radical
abolitionists, that Lockean political theory guaranteed black Americans,
slave and free, both their natural rights and their rights to citizenship,
moderate antislavery constitutional theory reconciled the Constitution
and its background political theory in an unappealing way. The distinc-
tion between national and state power over slavery, fundamental to the
moderate antislavery view, could sensibly interpret the Constitution as
serving its political theory of respect for equal rights only if national
power could be read as achieving such rights by abolition and coloniza-
tion. But, if Weld and the abolitionists were right, that interpretation of
the Constitution would violate the rights of black Americans-earned by
years of unremunerated labor in service of the national interest-to be
free and to be citizens. Was there an interpretation of the Constitution
that might better reconcile it with its background political theory?
38. Theodore Weld, The Power of Congress over Slavery in the District of Columbia (New
York, American Anti-Slavery Society 1838), reprinted in TEN BROEK, supra note 1, at 278.
39. See, eg., Abraham Lincoln, Speech on the Kansas-Nebraska Act (October 16, 1854),
in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858, at 307-08, 315-16 (Don E.
Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
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Radical antislavery constitutional theory responded to this question,
as we have seen, by interpreting the Constitution to forbid slavery both at
the national and state levels. Radical antislavery theory agreed with
moderate antislavery that the proper interpretive attitude towards the
United States Constitution must be Lockean political theory, but dis-
agreed about the best account of such theory-in particular, about what
rights black Americans in fact had in light of the wrongs inflicted on
them by American slavery and racism. Taking the view of political the-
ory that radical antislavery did, the moderate antislavery reading of the
Constitution, in terms of a federal-state dichotomy on the slavery issue,
could not be reasonably justified in light of protecting both human rights
and the public interest. Such an interpretation would allow abolition on
terms which violated the rights of black Americans as citizens. The bet-
ter interpretation-the one that over-all enabled the Constitution to be
read more coherently as in service of its political theory-was one that
made all participants in the American political community national citi-
zens and therefore bearers of the equal human rights of such citizen-
ship.' Under radical antislavery, the national government-both the
judiciary and Congress-thus had power to achieve the abolition of slav-
ery, but, in stark contrast to moderate antislavery, only on terms that
recognized the rights of black Americans to be both free and equal
citizens.
Radical antislavery was, as we have seen, self-consciously proposed
as an interpretive theory. However, its real force was its profound exter-
nal criticism of the Constitution on the very grounds central to the dis-
tinctive methodologies of American revolutionary constitutionalism. In
effect, the United States Constitution, constructed on the basis of a com-
plex empirical and normative assessment of the genre of republican con-
stitutionalism, was subjected to a comparably profound criticism by
radical antislavery in terms self-consciously inspired by the critical
achievement of the founding itself.
III. AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
It is fundamental to the American legal and political experience that
its revolutionary and constitutional project was conceived as a common
enterprise.41 Leading advocates of the American Revolution such as
40. Joel Tiffany generalized these arguments into a general constitutional principle "for
the equal protection of all, individually and collectively." TIFFANY, supra note 29, at 87.
41. The following discussion of American revolutionary and constitutional thought is an
abbreviated summary of the lengthy treatment of these matters in RiCHARDS, supra note 34.
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John Adams and Thomas Jefferson clearly saw constitutionalism at both
the state and national levels as the test of the very legitimacy of the
revolution. Accordingly, Jefferson wrote no less than three constitutions
for Virginia, and Adams was the main author of the Massachusetts con-
stitution of 1780 that was centrally used by the Founders in 1787.42 The
success of American constitutionalism was, for Adams and Jefferson, lit-
erally the test of the legitimacy of the revolution.
American revolutionary constitutionalism contained six critical in-
gredients-namely: (1) the Lockean political principles of the revolu-
tion; (2) the relationship of those principles to what Americans regarded
as the pathological misinterpretation of the British Constitution by the
British Parliament; (3) the analysis of political pathologies, for example,
the theory of faction, in light of the history of British constitutionalism
and the larger practice of republican and federal experiments over time;
(4) the use of such comparative political science in constructing new
structures of government free of the mistakes both of the British Consti-
tution and republican and federal experiments in the past; (5) the weight
placed on the experiments in the American states and in the nation be-
tween 1776 and 1787 in thinking about institutional alternatives; and
(6) the historically unique opportunity self-consciously recognized and
seized by Americans in 1787 to develop a novel republican experiment
that established a new government which was more politically legitimate
than the arguments of ordinary politics.
Radical antislavery brought the same critical ingredients of Ameri-
can revolutionary constitutionalism to bear when it criticized the Consti-
tution in light of its antebellum decadence. First, the distinctive depth of
its analysis derived from the remarkable moral independence of its artic-
ulation, on the basis of Lockean political theory, of basic human and
constitutional rights of all persons subject to the political power of the
United States.43 Second and third, that perspective enabled radical anti-
slavery to interpret the pathological misinterpretations of the Constitu-
tion as grounded not only in the slave power conspiracy,' but in the
pathological construction of American racism that the Constitution had
fostered,45 in effect legitimatizing the monstrous faction of white
For pertinent supporting arguments and citations, I refer the reader, in the text that follows, to
that discussion, not repeating here the citations contained there.
42. See id. at 19-20, 95, 106, 123, 124, 141.
43. See generally TIFFANY, supra note 29, at 271 (criticizing interpretations that read Con-
stitution as favoring slavery).
44. See DAVIS, supra note 33.
45. For the seminal analysis along these lines, see L. MARIA CHILD, AN APPEAL IN
FAVOR OF AMERICANS CALLED AFRICANS (photo. reprint 1968) (New York, John S. Taylor
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supremacy that Chief Justice Taney explicitly embraced as the proper
measure of constitutional rights in Dred Scott v. Sandford.46 Fourth and
fifth, comparative reflection on the earlier abolition of slavery by Britain
and the growing power of slave-holding interests in American politics,
both state and national, led the radical antislavery movement to identify
the crucial error of American constitutional design as the failure to take
seriously Madison's original constitutional suggestions that the nation
have the power to secure that states could not violate a nationally articu-
lated conception of human rights and the public interest.47 Madison's
theory of faction focused on local interests at the state level as the loci of
faction, and called for nationally representative institutions as a way of
detoxifying the evils of local factions.4 8 However, the most precisely op-
pressive of state factions-slavery at the state level-had been constitu-
tionally immunized from national scrutiny in terms of enforceable
standards of human rights and the public interest. This lacuna had, in
the view of radical antislavery, over time led to the degradation of the
Constitution by the worst form of factionalized insularity and oppression
as reflected in the political appeal to Douglas and Taney, among many
others, of Calhoun's proslavery constitutionalism with its denial of the
role of rights-based political theory in constitutional interpretation. Fi-
nally, the appropriate remedy must accordingly be a conception of na-
tional institutions with adequate competence and power to ensure that
the states, like the national government, respect the human rights of all
Americans.
IV. RADICAL ANTISLAVERY AND THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS
Radical antislavery offered its analysis as internal interpretive criti-
cism of dominant antebellum views of constitutional interpretation. It
1833). At the Constitutional Convention, Madison had himself described racism as one of the
worst forms of faction: "We have seen the mere distinction of colour made in the most en-
lightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over
man." James Madison, Speech Before the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 135 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
46. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). "[T]hey [blacks] had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect." Id. at 407.
47. Joel Tiffany, for example, sharply posed the crisis of American constitutionalism in
terms of the despotic powers of the states at home. See TIFFANY, supra note 29, at 55-56. It
was not the states that required protection "but the individual, crushed, and overwhelmed by
an insolent, and tyrannical majority, that needed such a guaranty; and to him, as a citizen of
the United States, whether in the majority, or minority, is that guaranty given, to secure him,
not only from individual, but also from governmental oppression." Id. at 110.
48. See RICHARDS, supra note 34, at 36-37.
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was, however, regarded as a marginal view of constitutional interpreta-
tion even among mainstream political abolitionists, most of whom gravi-
tated to moderate antislavery as the best theory of constitutional
interpretation.49 In the wake of the Civil War, the analysis of radical
antislavery occupied center stage in the critical reflection on American
constitutionalism culminating in the Reconstruction Amendments be-
cause it afforded the most reasonable analysis and diagnosis of the na-
tion's constitutional crisis and its solution." By the end of the Civil War,
slavery had effectively been ended in the South, and the new task became
forging a moral and constitutional vision that would memorialize the
fruits of that war in an enduring legacy of constitutional principle for
posterity. Both the North and the South had come to interpret the Civil
War as a controversy over the meaning of American revolutionary con-
stitutionalism ultimately justified by appeal to the right to revolution
when constitutional structures had proven radically inadequate to their
ultimate normative values. From the perspective of the Reconstruction
Congress, Southern secession was based on a perverse interpretation of
American revolutionary constitutionalism that appealed to the Constitu-
tion to justify the entrenchment of slavery, the ultimate violation of basic
human rights, against any possibility of inhibition by the federal govern-
ment under moderate antislavery's reasonable interpretation of the Con-
stitution of 1787. Proslavery constitutionalism, when carried to this
extreme, had become the systematic instrument for the permanent
abridgement of basic human rights, and the Civil War was thus justified
on the same grounds as the American Revolution had been justified
against a decadent form of British constitutionalism-namely, to protect
human rights and to forge constitutional forms more adequate to this
ultimate moral vision of legitimate government.
If the legitimacy of the American Revolution required a form of
constitutionalism, in contrast to the corrupt British Constitution, ade-
quate to its normative demands, the legitimacy of the Civil War required
a comparably profound reflection on constitutional decadence adequate
to its demands for a rebirth of rights-based constitutional government.
Radical antislavery's critical analysis of antebellum constitutional deca-
dence met this need because it was the most profound such reflection
culturally available in the genre of American revolutionary constitution-
49. For a good general treatment, see SEWELL, supra note 22, at 3-23.
50. I explore the argument merely sketched in this paragraph at much greater length in a
work in progress, David A.J. Richards, Conscience and the Constitution: Abolitionist Dis-
sent, The Second American Revolution and the Reconstruction Amendments (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
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alism forged by the Founders of 1787. Its great appeal for the American
constitutional mind was both its radical insistence on the primacy of the
revolutionary political theory of human rights central to American con-
stitutionalism and its brilliant reinterpretation of the ingredients of such
constitutionalism in light of that political theory and the events of ante-
bellum constitutional decadence and civil war. In light of its analysis,
radical antislavery supplied the most reasonable interpretation of the
Civil War as the second American Revolution, and offered, consistent
with the genre of American revolutionary constitutionalism, remedies
that plausibly could be and were regarded as the most justifiable way to
correct central defects in the Constitution of 1787, defects some of which
had been acknowledged by leading founders like Madison in 1787.51 The
Reconstruction Amendments, the most radical change in constitutional-
ism in our history, could thus be plausibly understood as a wholly rea-
sonable conservative way to preserve the legitimacy of the long-standing
project of American revolutionary constitutionalism.
The Reconstruction Amendments contain both negative and posi-
tive features: the abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude (Thir-
teenth Amendment) and the prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting (Fifteenth Amendment); the affirmative requirements of citizen-
ship for all Americans and nationally defined and enforceable guarantees
applicable against the states of equal protection, privileges or immunities,
and due process of law (Fourteenth Amendment). The political theory
of these prohibitions and requirements was Lockean political theory as it
had been articulated and applied in the antebellum period by radical an-
tislavery: all political power, now including the power of the states,
could be legitimate only if it met the requirement of extending to all per-
sons subject to such power respect for their inalienable human rights and
the use of power to pursue the public interest. And their constitutional
theory was, in light of the critical analysis of antebellum decadence of
radical antislavery, what such requirements of politically legitimate
power clearly required-nationally articulated, elaborated and enforcea-
ble constitutional principles that would preserve or tend to preserve the
required respect for rights and pursuit of the public interest. These guar-
antees thus textually included the central normative dimensions distinc-
tive of radical antislavery: the demand that all persons subject to the
burdens of allegiance to the political power of the United States be ac-
corded both their natural rights as persons and their equal rights as citi-
zens, based on the fundamental egalitarian requirement of politically
51. See RICHARDS, supra note 34, at 37-38.
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legitimate government as stated by the Equal Protection Clause. If the
Constitution of 1787 had made remarkably little textual reference to its
background political theory, the Reconstruction Amendments textually
affirmed and enforced that political theory with notable focus on the
forms of political pathology that had motivated antebellum constitu-
tional decadence-the untrammelled state power over abridgement of
human rights that had given rise to the political pathologies of the slave
power conspiracy in general and American racism in particular.52 Both
the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of racist sub-
jugation were thus negative corollaries of the affirmative principle of
equal respect for the rights of all persons subject to political power, and
therefore required the national articulation, elaboration and enforcement
of constitutional principles that defined the supreme law of the land be-
cause they secured the politically legitimate terms for the exercise of any
political power.
The Reconstruction Amendments, thus understood, responded to
the gravest crisis of constitutional legitimacy in our history, and are best
understood and interpreted as negative and affirmative constitutional
principles responsive to that crisis and any comparable crisis in the legiti-
macy of the Constitution as supreme law. Our interpretive attitude to-
day to these amendments must make the best sense of them in light of the
genre of American revolutionary constitutionalism that they assume and
critically elaborate in service of the narrative integrity of the story of the
American people and their struggle for a politically legitimate govern-
ment that respects human rights. I have here argued that abolitionist
political and constitutional theory played a crucial role in telling this
story, and our interpretive attitude today should take account of this the-
ory as part of an enriched sense of what our constitutional tradition is
and how it should be carried forward on the terms that do justice to it.
It cannot do justice to this enriched understanding of our interpre-
tive responsibilities to trivialize our interpretation of the Reconstruction
Amendments to some fictive search for the concrete exemplars to which
some suitably described majority of the Reconstruction Congress or the
ratifying states or, for that matter, advocates of radical antislavery would
or would not have applied the relevant clause under interpretation. The
political and constitutional theory of the Reconstruction Amendments
52. For a good statement of this general concern at the time of the introduction of the
Thirteenth Amendment on the floor of the House of Representatives, see Speech of Represen-
tative Henry Wilson (Mar. 19, 1864), in CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1199-1204
(1864).
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was rooted in the radically anti-positivist jurisprudence of radical anti-
slavery. It responded to the antebellum crisis of constitutional legitimacy
by requiring an interpretive attitude to the Constitution that would pre-
serve its legitimacy on the grounds of the rights-based theory of human
rights central to its claims to be the supreme law of the land.
Both Taney's originalism"3 and Stephen Douglas's majoritarian in-
terpretation of popular sovereignty54 were, from this perspective, equally
illegitimate attempts to evade the interpretive responsibilities of making
sense of the supremacy of the Constitution in terms of its protection of
the human rights of all persons subject to political power. Taney's use of
history and Douglas's majoritarianism substituted positivistic amoral
facts or procedures for the deliberative rights-based normative judgments
that could alone preserve the legitimacy of the Constitution as supreme
law, namely, its principled protection of human rights to the fullest ex-
tent feasible. In light of the text and background of the Reconstruction
Amendments, it would be, a fortiori, illegitimate today to make sense of
these amendments in a comparably evasive positivistic way-by appeal
to the concrete intentions of the founders (Bork) 5 or some picture of
majoritarian democracy unconcerned with basic human rights (Ely). 6
We mock our history and our traditions when we thus studiously
unlearn everything that our history and traditions, properly interpreted,
teach us. In contrast, we do interpretive justice to the role of the Recon-
struction Amendments in the larger narrative integrity of American con-
stitutionalism if and only if we ensure that the interpretation of the
Constitution, in order to be supreme law, is based today on our best de-
liberative normative judgments about the principled protection of human
rights in our circumstances. On this view, the enduring meaning of the
53. Taney argues in Dred Scott:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in rela-
tion to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or in this country,
should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal con-
struction in their favor than they were intended to bear when the instrument was
framed and adopted.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857). In fact, as Justice Curtis points out in
his dissent, Taney gets even his alleged originalist history of Founders' concrete intentions
wrong. See id. at 572-74 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
54. Popular sovereignty, irrespective of constitutional or natural rights, allowed states to
decide whether they would or would not have slavery. As one commentator observed, "Doug-
las looked upon popular sovereignty as essentially pragmatic and expedient." ROBERT W.
JOHANNSEN, STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 240 (1973).
55. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 251-59 (1990). For criticism, see David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without Foun-
dations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1373, 1376-77 (1990) (book review).




Reconstruction Amendments is that each generation of Americans must
strive by its own best lights to constitute itself on the basis of the most
inclusively reasonable understanding of universal human rights in its cir-
cumstances, not on the basis of indefensible conceptions of national iden-
tity, like Taney's white supremacy, that rest on the degradation of the
dignity of the human person. It is in light of such critical reflection on
the meaning of human rights in contemporary circumstances that Brown
v. Board of Education " was interpretively correct. It is for the same
reason that the contemporary interpretation of the Reconstruction
Amendments must strive deliberatively to articulate and protect a simi-
larly inclusive progressive conception of human rights in light of the best
arguments of public reason elaborated in our circumstances as a matter
of principle.
58
The interpretive attitude that radical antislavery had taken to the
Constitution was, as we have seen, insistent on the primacy of rights-
based political theory in constitutional interpretation, disowning history
and straining text in order to give maximum expression to the fullest
possible protection of human rights. We, however, need neither disown
history nor strain text to interpret the Reconstruction Amendments con-
sistent with the requirements of rights-based political theory, for both the
history and text of the Reconstruction Amendments make the best sense
only when understood in that way. Indeed, the enduring moral legacy of
radical antislavery to American constitutionalism is that its once implau-
sible interpretive attitude to the Constitution of 1787 has been rendered,
by virtue of the Reconstruction Amendments, the only plausible attitude
to the Constitution, as thus amended.
Rights-based egalitarian political theory must therefore play a cen-
tral role in the interpretation of the requirements of the Reconstruction
Amendments in contemporary circumstances. Such interpretive respon-
sibilities require us to take seriously what our rights are and how they are
to be understood and elaborated today on terms of principle. 59 The abo-
litionists give us a model of the forms of political and constitutional the-
ory that such responsibilities require us to generate in our circumstances.
Four features of abolitionist thought and practice are, in this con-
nection, notable. First, the abolitionists were the most principled and
57. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
58. For example, the protection of women and homosexuals from conceptions of national
identity is based on the abridgement of their basic human rights. For further development of
this approach, see generally DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1986) [hereinafter RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION]; see also RICHARDS,
supra note 34, at 252-72; Conscience and the Constitution, supra note 50.
59. See RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 58.
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morally independent advocates of the inalienable rights of conscience and
free speech in the antebellum period against the hostile tyranny of
majoritarian antebellum complacency so notably anatomized by de
Tocqueville. ° Second, their principled commitment to the inalienable
right to conscience and free speech enabled the abolitionists to elaborate
and extend the argument for toleration to identify critically new modes
of unjust sectarian oppression of basic rights that could not be reasonably
justified on the terms of public justification that were politically and con-
stitutionally required. The abolitionist criticism of both slavery and ra-
cism rested on the remarkable moral and intellectual independence with
which they made and pressed this argument.61 Third, the forms of polit-
ical and constitutional theory generated by the abolitionists critically
tested conventionally popular moral and constitutional views against the
most demanding standards of more abstract moral, political and consti-
tutional argument. Consistent with the argument for toleration, they
critically debunked what they found to be, on critical examination, po-
lemical sectarian arguments for deprivation of human rights whose polit-
ical force 6rucially depended on the viciously circular failure to allow any
fair testing of the empirical and normative claims that allegedly justified
the deprivation of basic rights, for example, slavery or racist subjugation.
Finally, abolitionist argument, while often meeting and surpassing the
highest intellectual and moral standards of the age, was not largely gen-
erated by mainstream politicians, judges or academics, but by remarka-
bly courageous moral, political and constitutional activists whose
concern was not with winning votes or securing judicial or academic ten-
ure, but with confronting the American public mind and conscience with
its failures of intellect, of morality and of civic republican fidelity to its
revolutionary constitutionalism.62 The abolitionists show us that the best
theory and practice work in tandem stimulating one another to a more
impartial realization of both the thought and practice of a political and
constitutional community based on the normative demands of a princi-
pled commitment to basic human rights for all persons subject to its
political power.
60. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 264-80 (Phillips Bradley
ed., 1945) (1835).
61. For two notable examples of arguments along these lines, see William E. Channing,
Slavery, reprinted in THE WORKS OF WILLIAM E. CHANNING 688-743 (Burt Franklin ed.,
1970) (1839); CHILD, supra note 45, at 42.
62. For some important recent general studies, see MERTON L. DILLON, THE ABOLITION-
ISTS: THE GROWTH OF A DISSENTING MINORITY (1974); LOUIS FILLER, THE CRUSADE
AGAINST SLAVERY (1960); JAMES B. STEWART, HOLY WARRIORS: THE ABOLITIONISTS
AND AMERICAN SLAVERY (1976); RONALD G. WALTERS, THE ANTISLAVERY APPEAL:




The forms of interpretive argument, forged by the abolitionists, were
precisely the same forms that have critically tested and transformed the
interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments often in service of the
demands of activist civil rights advocates who in the twentieth century
have played a role quite analogous to that of the abolitionists in the nine-
teenth century. The abolitionist argument of Frederick Douglass was
very much, both in thought and practice, the tradition self-consciously
carried forward by a civil rights advocate like Martin Luther King.63
Our task surely is by our own lights to be intellectually and morally wor-
thy of such a tradition or rather to embody in our thought and practice
the standards of moral, political and constitutional independence and
courage that will generate in our own terms and circumstances argu-
ments of human rights adequate to identify and to challenge our corrup-
tions, our decadent constitutionalism-whether the originalism of Bork
or the majoritarianism of Ely. Abolitionist political and constitutional
theory reminds us of how central to the American constitutional tradi-
tion that perennial challenge is, and also of our conservative
responsibilities.
63. For the writings of Frederick Douglass, see 5 THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDER-
ICK DOUGLASS (Philip S. Foner ed., 1975); for commentary, see WILLIAM S. MCFEELY,
FREDERICK DOUGLASS (1991); FREDERICK DOUGLASS: NEW LITERARY AND HISTORICAL
ESSAYS (Eric J. Sundquist ed., 1990). For the writings of Martin Luther King, Jr., see A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (James
M. Washington ed., 1986); for commentary, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS:
AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1990).
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